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RECENT CASES
BX7ILDI-G AND LOAN ASSOcIATIONS-RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDER TO WITHDRAW
AS AFFECTED BY LACK OF AVAILABLE FUNDS-Plaintiff, a shareholder in defendant building and loan association, sued to recover the withdrawal value of his
shares in the association, but failed to allege that defendant had funds with
which to pay his claim. Defendant averred in his affidavit of defense that the
funds in the treasury applicable by law to withdrawals, were not sufficient for
payment of the claim. Held, that this defense was sufficient to prevent summary
judgment for the plaintiff. Brown v. Victor Building and Loan Association, 153
At. 349 (Pa. i93I).'One of the most important rights possessed by a stockholder of a building
and loan association, which distinguishes this type of organization from the
ordinary private corporation, is the right to withdraw from the association.' So
important is this right that it is generally held to be a vested one and not subject
to limitation by the by-laws of an association in derogation of the statute or
by-laws which grant it.' Since a stockholder in a building and loan association
is essentially a partner in the enterprise and since he can do nothing to defeat
the interests of those who have joined him as members of an association,' this
right of withdrawal is suspended by the insolvency of the association.' Upon the
same theory, when the shares of a particular series have matured,6 or when the
association is about to be dissolved and nothing remains to be done but to effect
a distribution - the member has no right to withdraw. This is also true if he
'Cf. Stone v. New Schiller B. & L. Assn., decided by the Supreme Court of
Pernsylvania, January 5, 1931.
2 Latimer v. Equitable Loan & Investment Co., 81 Fed. 776 (W. D. Mo.
1897) ; Lepore v. Twin Cities National B. & L. Ass'n, 5 Pa. Super. 276 (1897) ;
SUNDHEiMi, LAW OF BtLDING AND LoA, AssocIATIoxs (2d ed. 1922) §§ 146,
147. On the general subject of withdrawals see Freedman, Withdrawal from
Building and Loan Associations (193o) 5 TEmPLE L. Q. 79; Note (1897) 35
L. R. A. 289; Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1129.
'-Iolyoke B. & L. Ass'n v. Lewis, I Colo. App. 127. 27 Pac. 872 (I89I);
Savage v. People's B. L. & Savings Ass'n, 45 W. Va. 275, 31 S. E. 991 (1898);
EI.DLICH, BuII.NG AssocI.TIoxs (2d ed. 1895) § 99. Contra: Bearden v. People's B. L. & Savings Ass'n, 49 S. W. 64 (Tenn. 1898). The right of a stockholder
in a building association to withdraw expresses a public policy and cannot be
waived, Latimer v. Equitable Loan & Investment Co., supra note 2; but reasonable by-laws may be enacted, Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward Loan Ass'n, 148 N. Y.
281, 42 N. E. 710 (1896).
'Aldrich v. Gray, 147 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o6) ; Christian's Appeal,
102 Pa. 184 (1883).
'Allman v. Berg Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, ioo Pa. Super. --o5 (193o) has recently squarely decided the question, adopting the doctrine of Christian's Appeal,
supra note 4, which has often been cited for the proposition, although that case
was decided on the question of distribution after insolvency; Smith v. Bath Loan
& Building Ass'n, x26 Me. 59, 136 Atl. 284 (1927).
'Laurel Run Bldg. Ass'n v. Sperring, io6 Pa. 334 (1884) ; SUNDHEIM, Op.
cit. supra note 2, § 148.
ENDLICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 108.
(802)

RECENT CASES
has pledged his stock as security for a loan.' Aside from these limitations,
however, a member of a solvent association can enforce his right to withdraw
9
and, after giving the notice required by the statute or by-laws. can sue the
association and recover judgment against it for the amount of the withdrawal
value of the shares plus the interest provided by the by-laws." The effect of
the judgment in most jurisdictions is to make him a creditor'u and to give him a
In order to keep the right of withdrawal
lien on the realty of the association.
within reasonable limits and to prevent financial embarrassment to the association, legislatures in many jurisdictions and by-laws of associations have provided
that no more than a certain percentage of the funds in the treasury of the association may be applied to withdrawals unless the board of directors provides
Under statutes of this sort, a majority of courts have followed the
otherwise."
doctrine that where the amount is not available the shareholder cannot recover
judgment against the association." Many of these states have further provided
that the plaintiff must allege in his statement of claim that the funds are present
in the treasury, and that unless he does so and proves this as part of his case he
The courts of a few jurisdictions which formerly
has no cause of action.'
included Pennsylvania, have followed the contrary doctrine that the lack of available funds will not prevent judgment but that the court will restrain execution

'Watkins v. Workingmen's B. & L. Ass'n, 97 Pa. 514 (880.
(West, 192o) § 2421, infra note 13.

PA. STAT.

The shareholder must comply with the conditions to be entitled to withdrawal, Hoyt v. Harbor & Suburban B. & S. Ass'n, ig7 N. Y. 113, go N. E.
349 (0909).
' Where the by-laws fail to provide the rate of interest, the legal rate is
payable, Lepore v. Twin Cities National B. & L. Ass'n, supra note 2.
1 Enterprise B. & L. Society v. Bolin, 12 Colo. App. 304, 55 Pac. 74o (i89S);
In, re National Building Loan & Provident Ass'n, 12 Del. Ch. 93, 107 Atl. 453
(gig) ; EXDLIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § IiO.
' In re National Building Loan & Provident Ass'n, supra note I.
"The provisions of the Pennsylvania statute are typical: PA. STAT. (West,
1920) § 2421, "Any stockholder wishing to withdraw from the said corporation,
shall have power to do so by giving thirty days' notice of his or her intention
to withdraw . . . Provided. That at no time shall more than one-half of the
funds in the treasury of the corporation be applicable to the demands of withdrawing stockholders without the consent of the board of directors, and that no
stockholder shall be entitled to withdraw whose stock is held in pledge for
security . . ." PA. ST.AT. (West, 1920) § 2422, "Payment of the value of the
stock so withdrawn, shall only be due when the funds now by law applicable to
the demand of withdrawing stockholders are sufficient to meet and liquidate the
same, and then only in the order of the respective times of presentation of the
notices of such withdrawals . . ."
"Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward Loan Ass'n, supra note 3; Domestic Bldg.
Ass'n v. Jourdain, iiO II. App. 197 (19o3); Heinbokel v. National Savings,
Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, 38 Minn. 340, 59 N. W. lO5O (1894) ; Andrews v. Roanoke
Bldg. Ass'n, 98 Va. 445, 36 S. E. 531 (1900).
"Heinbokel v. National Savings, Loan & Bldg. Ass'n, supra note 14; Stilwell v. People's Building, Loan & Savings Ass'n, i9 Utah 257, 57 Pac. 14
(8g&9) ; Eastern B. & L. Ass'n v. Snyder, 98 Va. 710, 37 S. E. 298 (19oo).
Contra: Huntington County Loan & Savings Ass'n v. Emerick, 23 Ind. App.
175, 53 N. E. io6 (1899). The instant case seems to hold that the plaintiff must
allege a sufficiency of funds in Pennsylvania; but the case apparently does not
stand for so broad a proposition and the question is therefore still an open one.
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thereon until such time as the requisite funds are present.' These cases proceeded on the theory that the right accrues to the stockholder immediately but
that the funds are not to be paid until they are available. The instant case
departs from this view and brings Pennsylvania in line with the majority of
jurisdictions in holding that the absence of funds required by law prevents
judgment against the association. This view theoretically seems sounder in that
the statutes have enunciated a policy of protecting the association from a host
of suits by stockholders where there are not sufficient funds to meet their deIn such a situation the stockholder should not be permitted to acquire
mands.'
a lien on the association's real estate and thus tie up its property to the possible
detriment of the association and other stockholders. The court in the principal
case in departing from the classic Pennsylvania rule is wisely guided by sound
legal theory and by the economic necessity arising out of the recent real estate
deflation and consequent shrinkage in value of real estate security."

CONFLICT OF LAWs-ToRTS-DISCHARGE

OF OBLIGATION

BY SUBSEQUENT

MARRIAGE OF PARTIEs-The plaintiff brought this action in Wisconsin to recover
for personal injuries sustained as a result of defendant's negligence in the State
of Illinois. After the commencement of the action, but prior to the date of the
trial, plaintiff married the defendant outside the state of Illinois. The parties
were domiciled in Wisconsin. Under the Illinois law the cause of action was
extinguished by the subsequent marriage. By the law of Wisconsin, the marriage of the parties had no effect on the cause of action. Held, that the law of
Illinois governed and that, therefore, the cause of action was extinguished.
Buckeye v. Buckeye, 234 N. V. 342 (Wis. 193).
The American courts are uniform in holding that the law governing the
right to recover upon a foreign cause of action in tort is that of the place where
the operative facts occurredY The rule rests rn the theory that the cause of
action is created by the lex loci delicti in substitution for the right accorded by
that jurisdiction and violated by the tort-feasor. In conformance with this
theory, the courts have developed the further rule that the extent as well as the
creation of the right is governed by the lex loci.2 In determining which factors
affect the extent of the plaintiff's right, the courts have distinguished between
matters of substance and matters of procedure, applying the rule that the former
1
is controlled by the lex loci and the latter by the fcx fori Ordinary statutes
" U. S. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Silverman, 85 Pa. 394 (1877) is the leading case; Inisto v. Metropolitan Savings Ass'n, 68 N. J. L. 589, 53 AtI. 206
(19o2); McGovern v. Cosmopolitan Savings & Loan Ass'n, 44 Pa. Super. 212
(1910).

" Engelhardt v. Fifth Ward Loan Ass'n, supra note 3, at 285; 42 N. E.
at 711.
' Freedman, op. cit. supra note 2, at 79.
1

GooDRicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927)

§ 92.
194 U. S. 120, 24

S. Ct. 581 (904);
237 U. S. 487, 35 S. Ct. 655 (1914).
Spokane and I. E. Ry. Co. v. Whitley,
GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note I, § 81 et seq.
2Slater v. Mexican National Ry. Co.,
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of limitation have been treated generally as matters affecting merely the remedy.'
In cases, however, where the statute creating the right limits the time within
which the right may be enforced, the limitation is held to be a substantive matter 5 Since the limitation in this type of case is imposed by the very statute
creating the right, the situation presents little difficulty. In Davis -. Mills, the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the more troublesome case of a
statute enacted after the cause of action arose and limiting the time within
which such an action could be brought. In holding the limitation effective in
the le.r fori, the court further established the control of the ler fori over causes
of action sought to be enforced in other jurisdictions. A still stronger case is
that of Phillips v. Eyre, where recovery for a cause of action which arose in
Jamaica was denied in England because of a subsequent statute in Jamaica
making the assault lawful. Perhps the cases most analogous to the principal
one are those where the question of the survival of the right of action was
involved, and those where the law governing the assignability of a claim was
the issue. The rule of the majority of the courts on the survivorship question
8
is that the law of the place where the cause of action arose governs. There
There
are, however, a substantial number of states holding the contrary view
Text authorities advocate the
are but few cases on the assignability question.
view that the le.r loci contractus should govern on the theory that the law governing the creation of the claim ought to determine the rights, if any, that may
be assigned under it.' By analogy to the situations mentioned, the result reached
in the principal case seems to be consistent with the authorities. The right of
action, having been created by the law of Illinois, is subject to the Illinois defense of extinguishment by the subsequent marriage of the parties. The decision is also consistent with the principle that a recovery should be denied in the
lez fori when it is barred in the Ic.r loci. It is difficult, however, to reconcile
the decision with the proposition that, with certain exceptions, the law of the
domicile of the parties determines the rights of the spouses in their movable
If that concept is to be the governing principle, then it would seem
property.'
' Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407 (U. S. i85o); Thomas v. Clarkson, 125
Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77 (19o6) ; Byrne v. Crowninshield, 17 Mass. 55 (1820).
'The Harrisburg, I19 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. r40 (186) ; STORY, COxFLICT OF
LAws (8th ed. 1883) § 582.
194 U. S.451, 24 S. Ct. 692 (1904).
L. R. 6 Q. B. I (I87O).
'Orr v. Ahren, io7 Conn. 174, 139 Atd. 69i (t928) ; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L.
& P. Rv., 61 Iowa 44I, I6 N. W. 35i (1883) ; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry.,
38 Vt. -294 (1865).
'Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Joy, 173 U. S. 2--6, 19 Sup. Ct. 387 (1898);
Austin v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 122 Ky 304, 91 S. W. 74z (i9o6);
(i93i) 6 Wisc. L. RFv. 103.
" Vimont v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 69 Iowa 296, 22 N. W. 906 (i886).
" GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 1, 366.
1 DicvY, COxFLCT OF LAws (4th ed. 1927) 716. GOODRICH, Op. Cit. Supra
note i, 275. The reason for the extinguishment of the cause of action under the
Illinois law is the fact that Illinois still retains the common law rule that the
husband on marriage acquires, in his own right, all the choses in action of the
wife. If a chose in action is to be considered as "movable property", how can
the law of Illinois affect the ownership of the chose in action of a Wisconsin
wife?
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that the Illinois rule on extinguishment would not apply to parties domiciled in
Wisconsin even though the rights in the cause of action were created by Illinois
law.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-INSURANcE-POWER

OF THE STATE TO Fix THE

had
contracted with defendant-insurance company to receive twenty-five per cent. of
prescribed premiums as commissions. Subsequently New Jersey passed a statute'
providing that in order to establish reasonable rates for fire insurance, it shall
be unlawful to allow any compensation in excess of that paid to any one of its
agents. Defendant urged the statute as a defense, in refusing to pay more than
twenty per cent. which it paid other agents. Hcd, (four justices dissenting)
that the statute was constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 51 Sup. Ct. 130
(U. S. 193).
It is well settled that the rights guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution are not absolute' and hence when a business is, or
becomes affected with a public interest, the enterprise may be regulated to an
extent which would be unreasonable were it not one so affected 3 The business of
insurance' and the relations of those engaged therein ' are affected with a public
interest. Accordingly the issue presented in the principal case is whether or not
this statute is within the category of reasonable insurance regulation.' The court
was confronted with the broad language that had been used in former Supreme
Court decisions on the question of rate determination. The opinions had expressed the principle that the freedom of contract in setting the price term is a
liberty guaranteed to the individuals and can be justifiably abridged by legislative
authority only when special circumstances exist.' Such sweeping language had
established a marked reluctance on the part of the Court to sustain price-fixing
regulations except in the field of public utilities or when confronted with an
emergency.'
Several considerations assisted the court in reaching the conclusion
of the instant case without the necessity of openly altering their former position.
RATE OF COMPENSATION

OF AGENTS IN FIRE INsuRAcE-Plaintiff-agents

2'N.

J. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1928) c. 129, p. 257.
American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Shallenberger, 183 Fed. 636 (D. C. Neb.

I91O).8

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S.

678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (1888) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup.
Ct. i86 (igio) ; Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct 729 (1913).
' German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612
(914); North American Insurance Co. v. Yates, 214 Ill. 272, 73 N. E. 423
(9o5) ; Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 30 Atl. 217 (1894).
0 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 16o (1919)
(requiring
local residence).
'Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct 630 (1922).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1897) ; Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. I, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (I9i5) ; Adkin's v. Children's Hospital, 261
U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923) ; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418,
47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927) ; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545
(1928).
' Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
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In previous opinions the Court had observed that "it is illusory to speak of the
liberty to contract" " in purchasing insurance, and that "the business of insurance
has very definite characteristics with a reach of influence and consequences beyond
and different from that of the ordinary businesses of the commercial world" "0
and further, that the relations of those engaged therein were affected with a
In addition, the Court was impressed with the fact that the
public interest."
commissions of agents are a controlling element in the determination of the
rate ' paid by the insured and that this regulation is only one degree removed
from the aggregate amount which admittedly can be established. The Court was
further aided by the absence of any allegation of fact tending to show that the
statute was unreasonable, and accordingly the presumption in favor of its validity
prevailed.' In recent years the Court has only cccasionally invoked this presumption " and in some instances the question has been approached on the basis
of stare decisis and hence any regulation abridging liberty of contract was preThe conclusion of the Court will be largely consumed to be unconstitutional.'
trolled by which of these presumptions is adopted by the Court at the outset.
Whether or not in any given case the Court will start from the presumption in
favor of constitutionality or will approach the problem on the basis of stare
decisis is problematical. In attempting to predict the legality of future price
regulation it should be noted that the minority in the principal case comprised
the majority in former decisions invalidating price regulation, whereas the majority includes the former dissenting justices and the two recent appointees.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF THE RATIFIcATION OF THE EIGHTEENTH
AMENDmENT-The defendant was indicted for a violation of the National Pro-

hibition Act.' The Federal Distrcr Court for New Jersey granted the motion
of the accused to quash the indictment, holding that the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment was invalid.' The government appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held, that "by lawful proposal and ratification' the Eighteenth Amendment "has
become a part of the Constitution." United States v. Sprague et al., decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States, U. S. Daily, Feb. 25, i931, at 3943.
'German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, supra note 2, at 416, 34 Sup. Ct.
at 621.
Ibid at 414, 34 Sup. Ct. at 6,o.
U La Tourette v. McMaster, supra note 3, at 467, 39 Sup. Ct. at 161.
"Principal case at 132.
"Principal case at 133.

"The same approach of the majority was also adopted in Corporation Commission of Oklahoma v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 438 (930): "It was incumbent
upon the appellee in invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to
show with convincing clarity that the law of the State created against him the
discrimination which he complained."
"Burns

Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 513, 44 Sup. Ct. 412, 413

(1923): . . . it is the duty of the court to determine whether the challenged
provision has reasonable relation to the protection . . ."; see also Ribnik v.
McBride; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, both supra note 7.
'U. S. C. Title 27, 12. (Here unlawful possession and transportation.)
-United States v. Sprague et a!., 44 F. (2d) 967 (D. N. J. i93o).
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In this decision the Supreme Court has again upheld the validity of the
Eighteenth Amendment. As in previous instances, notably the National Prohibition Cases,' ingenious arguments were presented to the court; and again met
with no favorable reception. The essential objection to the amendment here
advanced was that an amendment of this nature, conferring on the Federal Government new and direct powers over individuals, could only be ratified by conventions in the several states. The reasons offered in support of this position
were twofold. Counsel for the appellee urged the argument presented by them
to the lower court and by it rejected; an argument based on the supposed intent
of the makers of the Constitution.' There was also urged upon the court the
argument followed by the lower court in its opinion which reached the same
conclusion by resort, to considerations drawn from "political science" and "a
scientific approach to the problems of government."' Refusing to sanction either
suggested line of argument, the Supreme Court clearly and succinctly points out
that the adoption of either argument would abrogate the clear and unambiguous
language of Article V of the Constitution ' which confers unlimited power upon
Congress to choose the method of ratification.' There have been cases involving
253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486 (i92o).

The attack here was on three

grounds: (i) That the word "Amendment" as used in Article V did not include
.'alteration". (2) That the amendment was in effect legislation. (3) That
because of the Tenth Amendment or because of the federal system or both,
amendments changing the distribution of powers as between the states and the
United States, and thus reducing the states' police power, are forbidden. The
method of ratification was also unsuccessfully attacked in Hawke v. Smith, 253
U. S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 495 (192o) ; and Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 41 Sup.
Ct. 510 (1921).

'The argument of counsel was based on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution, as shown by the fact that they thought ratification of the
Constitution must be by the people in conventions rather than by legislatures, as
the latter were incompetent to surrender the personal liberties of the people to the
National Government.
'The opinion of the lower court is based not on the intent of the framers
but upon a historical review of the use of conventions and of the theories of
political science. To quote from the decision (at p. 981) :
"Political science can give only one answer to the question presented by
the alternative methods of ratification proposed by article 5. If the amendment to be considered is one designed to transfer to the United States powers
heretofore reserved to the states, or, if there are any such, to the people, that
answer must be in favor of the convention system. This follows from the
character of such amendments and from the character of the delegates to
and the deliberations in a constitutional convention, as compared to the corresponding character of the personnel of state Legislatures and their deliberations."
'Article V of the Constitution provides: "The Congress, whenever twothirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the
several states, shall call a convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress."
To quote from the opinion, by Roberts, J.,
"The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary sense as distinguished
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questions of constitutional construction where the Court has had to go beyond
the four comers of the Constitution itself in order to interpret some of its proSuch a course has often been criticized;" even in spite of the fact that
visions
the provisions in question were of the broad and vague nature which would
render interpretation exceedingly difficult solely on the basis of the language
employed. In the instant case the Constitution speaks in unambiguous language
and it is not for the court to indulge in speculative theorizing of its own to
escape the effect of such language. In this connection it is interesting to note
that the lower court criticizes the result of the National Prohibition Cases for
seeming to establish the doctrine that the substance of an amendment "might
have to conform to the particular theories of political science, sociology, economics, etc., held by the current judicial branch of the government." " Yet under
its own views the judiciary would be entitled to disregard any amendment ratified
by the legislatures by the mere decision that its nature was such that it should
have been submitted to conventions." Much sounder would seem to be the decision of our highest tribunal that the intent of the founders is to be found in the
Constitution itself in the apparent meaning of the words there used in the
absence of any uncertainty or ambiguity.

CONTRACTs-BILLS AND

'OTES-PRO

IISE TO CONTINUE TO PAY INTEREST

AS CONSIDERATION FOR PRO.MISE TO EXTEND DUE DATE-After maturity of a
note, the maker and payee orally agreed to a definite time extension. They also
agreed that subsequent purchases of furniture by payee in maker's store be
charged against principal and interest on payment date. Payee sued on the note
before the time orally agreed to had elapsed. Held., that payee could recover
because there was no consideration for the extension agreement. Hecht v.
Hecht, 301 Pa. 379 (1930).

By the weight of authority, a promise made after the maturity of a note to
continue to pay interett until a certain designated date is consideration for the
from technical meaning; where their intention is clear there is no room for
construction and no excuse for interpolation and addition," citing cases.
The court also cites previous cases in which the court had declared (though by
way of dictum) that the choice of the mode rested solely in the discretion of
Congress. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (1856) ; and cases cited suprra note 3.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, I7U. S.
316 (r8ig) ; Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S.393 (1857) ; United States v. Gettysburg
Ry. Co., 16o U. S.668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
'WILLOUGHBY, I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF U. S. (i910) 2 et seq. (on 'arbury v. Madison, supra note 9) ; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNS (7th
ed., i9o3) IOI (discussing the broad principle, here with reference to state constitutions) ; Dodd, Amending the Constitution, 30 YALE L. J. 321, 322 (1920) (in
connection with discussion National Prohibition Cases, supra note 3) ; and on the
subject in general, Corwin, Judicial Revicw in Action (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 639, 658 et seq.; Orsdell, Back to the Constitution (i930) 9 NEB. L. Bur- 77.
At p. 970.

This procedure would be contrary to the established principles of judicial
review. Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) ; Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 385 (U. S.1788) ; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. i8io).
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promise of the payee to extend the time of payment 1 The promise to pay
interest may be implied from the transaction. Thus, a mere agreement to extend
an interest-bearing obligation has been adjudged to include a promise to pay
interest.' An analysis of this promise shows it to fit exceedingly well the usual
definitions of consideration. The note having matured, the payee by a new
agreement is in substance re-lending the principal for a certain period in consideration for a promise to pay interest. He is doing exactly the same thing that
he did when the original loan was made. Then he took back a written promise,
now he takes back an oral one. Certainly, if the first transaction was supported
by consideration,' the second one must be, especially since an oral contract to
extend is valid.' The payee has achieved the same result and benefit in both
cases, and that is an investment 1 The maker of the original note, on the other
hand, has given up his right to pay the principal, and to stop the accrual of interest. Instead, by his promise, he has bound himself to his debt and to the
burden of making interest payments for the time agreed upon. This is a legal
detriment.' The Pennsylvania court in the instant case, followirg precedent,refused to recognize the promises as mutual obligations. It is unfortunate that
the court should have been so bound by precedent that they permitted it to overbalance elementary principles of contract. One case,' although not directly deciding the question, pointed out the way to the logical result, but the instant
court would not follow its suggestion. The decision of the instant case seems
particularly unfortunate since the court could have found consideration in the
'Lahn v. Koep, 139 Iowa 349, 115 N. W. 877 (igoS) ; Chute v. Pattee, 37
Me. io2 (854) ; Fawcett v. Freshwater, 31 Ohio St. 637 (877) ; I WILLsISToN,
Co-TRAcTs (1924) § 122; Contra: Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E.
5 (899).
"Adamson v. Bosick, 83 Cal. 309, 259 Pac. 513 (1927) ; Adkins-Polk Co. v.
Rhodes, 24 S. V. (2d) 351 (Tex. i93o).
BIGELow,

BiLas,

NOTES AND CHEQUES (2d ed. 19oo) 242.

, Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, 178 N. C. 89, i5o S. E. 676 (1929);
McNeill v. Simpson, 24 S. W. (2d) 485 (Tex. i93o).
' Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 S. W. mc6i (1895).
I Lahn v. Koep, supra note i.
Since the maker of the note had the right .o
pay the principal, once the note matured, by binding himself not to do so for a
stated period of time, he was binding himself to do something he was not already
legally bound to do.
'Rumberger v. Golden, 99 Pa. 34 (1881) ; Dow v. Chambers, 37 Leg. Int.
399 (Pa. 188o) ; Campbell v. Daly, 25 Leg. Int. 124 (Pa. i868) ; Partridge v.
Partridge, 38 Pa. 78 (i86o). The substance of the reasons for these decisions
is that the maker of the note only promised to do what he would have to do, that
is, to pay the legal rate of interest after maturity. But the courts seemed to
forget that the maker had the right to pay off the principal any time and cause
the accrual of interest to cease. By an agreement to pay interest for a definite
time, the maker is depriving himself of this right, and binding himself to continue payment of interest for the specified period. This is doing more than the
maker is legally bound to do, and therefore is consideration for the promise
to extend.
'In Shoemaker v. Farrel, 64 Pa. Super. 34, 40 (1916), the court said, "When
money is placed at interest, the earning power of such investment is a consideration for the loan and when it is agreed that a certain rate per cent. shall be paid,
this constitutes the inducement for the loan; there is no substantial reason why
such consideration should not support the extension of time of a note or obligation past due when such extension is made for a definite time, as well as such
consideration supporting the obligation when it is originally created."
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promise of the maker of the note to allow the payee to purchase goods from him
and to use this as a set-off against the debt. Thus the payee was given an option
as to whether he would take money or goods, and hence there appears to be consideration,' even on this ground, for the promise of the payee to extend the time
for payment.

C.NTRAkCTS--.IARRIAGE BROK.GE AGREEMENTS-In an action upon a mortgage, defendants pleaded that in consideration of their granting consent to the
marriage of their fifteen-year-old daughter to the mortgagee, the mortgagee had
agreed to refrain from collecting any principal or interest on the mortgage while
either of the defendants remained alive. The mortgagee was seventy-one years
old at the time of the marriage. Held, that the contract was invalid, and that the
mortgage was enforceable according to its terms. Braun v. Potter Title &
Trust Co., 132 Atl. 751 (Pa. 193o).
A marriage brokage contract is an agreement to recompense an individual
for his services in bringing about a marriage between others,' and is invalid as
being against public policy.' Where a bond has been given by a party to the
marriage brokage contract, it will be decreed cancelled,- and if consideration
has already been paid, it will be ordered returned, even though the terms of the
contract have been fully performed.' So strong is the feeling against these contracts, that an agreement to pay a third party for hastening an intended marriage
is unenforceable,' although the possibility of fraud in such a situation is very
slight. The object of the courts in declaring marriage brokage contracts invalid is to permit the parties to the marriage untrammeled freedom of choice,
and to prevent interference by other persons who have their own selfish interests
'
Where, as in the principal case, parental consent is necessary before
at heart.
0 1 WILLISTO.N, CONTRXCS (924)

§ 140.

' White v. Equitable Nuptial Ben. Union, 76 Ala. 251 (1884).
' White v. Equitable Nuptial Ben. Union, supra note I; In re Globe, 1Iowa 121, 102 N. W. 804 (io5) ; Johnson v. Hunt, 81 Ky. 321 (883) ; Craw)
ford v. Russel, 62 Barb. 92 (N. Y. 1872 ; Keat v. Allen, 2 Vern. 588 (707) ;
Greenhood, Public Policy (1886) 478; 3 WILLISTOX, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1741,
note 78.
'Drury v. Hooke, I Vern. 412 (I686) ; Hamilton v. Mlohun, 2 Vern. 652
(1710) ; CLARI, EQEITY (1928) § 402.
' Wenninger v. Mitchell, 139 M1o. App. 42o, I22 S. W. 1130 (19o9) ; Durval
v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343 (1891) ; Herman v. Charesworth
[i9o5] 2 K. B. 123. The German Civil Code (1896) provides that no obligation
is created by a marriage brokage contract, but that what has been paid on such
a contract may not be demanded back. This seems more in accord with the
common law principle that the courts will not grant relief to a party to an illegal
contract. For a discussion of the reasons for granting relief to a party to a
marriage brokage contract who has paid over the consideration, see VOODWARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS (1913)

§ 151.

Morrison
.v. Rodgers, 115 Cal. 252, 46 Pac. 1072 (i86) ; Jangraw v. Perkins, 76 Vt. i-, 56 At. 532 (9o3).
'Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. l:1z (i8o) ; Vn..ALRD, EQUITY (1875) 211.
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the marriage can take place, the parents should act for the best interests of the
child, and the doctrine of public policy which is designed to prevent thoughts of
personal gain from influencing the actions of the parents, is both sound and
commendable.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DmECTING A VERDICr OF GUILTY-The

defendant

was indicted for the crime of robbery. His own testimony given at the trial
pointed to his guilt. The court charged the jury that the defendant was guilty
either of the crime of robbery or of an attempt to commit the crime and charged
them as a matter of law to return one or the other of these verdicts. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty of robbery, after which the defendant moved for a
new trial which motion was denied. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the
charge was erroneous but not prejudicial and that a new trial was properly
denied. State V. Corey, 233 -. W. 59o (Minn. i93o).
There is some difference of opinion whether, in a criminal case, where the
facts are undisputed, the court may direct a verdict of guilty, as it may direct a
verdict of acquittal. The rule, upheld by the great weight of authority, is that
it is error, under any circumstances, so to direct.2 The reason for the rule,
according to some courts, is that the right of the defendant to a trial by a jury
includes the right to a verdict by the jury. Other courts advance the reason
that since the judge could not grant a new trial after a verdict of acquittal by
the jury, he should not be allowed to achieve the same result by instructing the
jury to find a verdict of guilty.' The court, in the principal case, although it
follows the majority rule, comes to an opposite conclusion, on the ground that

'Ellison v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 305, 227 S. W. 458 (1921) ; Commonwealth v. Teregno, 234 Mass. 56, 124 N. E. 889 (i919) ; Commonwealth v. Yost,
197 Pa. 171, 46 At. 845 (i9oo); Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, i0 N. W.
1087 (905).

'United States v. Taylor, ii Fed. 47o (C. C. D. Kan. 1882) ; State v. Koch,
33 Mont. 490, 8i Pac. 272 (i96) ; "In criminal cases it is not in the province
or power of the court trying the case to direct a verdict of guilty, no matter how
strong, clear and unimpeached the evidence may be on the part of the prosecution." Territory v. Kee, ry N. M. 510, 514, 25 Pac. 924, 925 (1891). Cotra:
United States v. Anthony, ii Blatchford 2oo (Fed. 1873) (The court stated
that it did not doubt the power and duty of the judge to direct a verdict of guilty,
wherever the facts constituting guilt are undisputed. The federal courts now,
however, seem to be committed to the general rule, United States v. Taylor, supra
note 2) ; State v. Herold, 9 Kan. 194 (1872) ; People v. Ackerman, go Mich.
588, 45 N. W. 367 (i89o) ; People v. N eumann, 85 Mich. 98, 48 N. W. 290
(1891). But even in Michigan the judge is not allowed to discharge the jury
and direct the clerk to enter the verdict because it must be a verdict rendered by
the jury, People v. Curry, 163 Mich. i8o, 128 N. V. 213 (1910).
'State v. Koch, suin-a note 2; "The plea of not guilty imposes upon the
state the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the sufficiency of the evidence is always for the jury and not for the court."
State v. Picker, 64 Mo. App. 126, 128 (1895).
' United States v. Taylor, supra note 2, at 472, "It has never, to my knowledge, been claimed that if the jury disregarded the law as laid down by the
court, and render a general verdict of not guilty, the court can set it aside; and
if this cannot be done by an order after verdict, how can the court do substantially the same thing by an instruction before verdict?"
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the defendant was not prejudiced because he had admitted his guilt by his own
testimony. It should not be overlooked, however, that he had pleaded not guilty
and hence an issue was presented which was for the jury to decide. The court
further reasoned that since the jury found the defendant guilty of the more
serious crime of the alternatives presented to them it was not to be assumed that
they would have acquitted him if the charge had permitted such a verdict. It
cannot be denied, however, that the jury has the power to disregard the evidence
and acquit.5 If this right to have a verdict of acquittal by the jury is denied to
the defendant it would seem that he is prejudiced.

EVIDENC--ADMISSIBILITY OF DYING DECLARATIONS IN CIVIL AcTION-Plaintiff sued for damages for the death of her husband Which resulted from
injuries sustained in an automobile collision alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Held, that oral declarations made by the husband of the
plaintiff concerning the circumstances of the accident, including an admission of
responsibility by defendant, were properly admitted since they were made under
a sense of impending death and concerned matters about which declarant could
have testified had he survived. Bagnall v. Hnto, 293 Pac. 733 (Kan. 1930).
While there is some uncertainty as to whether dying declarations, prior to
i8oo, were regarded as admissible in civil as well as criminal actions,' at least
from the beginning of the nineteenth century it became well settled that their
admissibility was stringently restricted to criminal cases of homicide in which the
death of the declarant was the issue.' Additional limitations curb their use even
in such instances.' Some adverse criticism has consequently been evoked by the
arbitrary limits thus established and it has been vigorously contended that the
same guarantee of truthfulness which warrants the admission of such evidence
'Horning v. Disrtict of Columbia, 254 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 53 (1920) in
which case the court held that it was no error for the judge to instruct the jury
to the effect that he could not tell them in so many words to find the defendant
guilty but that what he said amounted to that; "The plea of not guilty disputes
the credibility of the evidence even when uncontradicted since there is the presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by the verdict of the jury."
State v. Riley, 113 N. C. 648, I8 S. E. 168 (1893).
'3 WIGMOIRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1431; I GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (I6th
ed. 189) § I56a; JoNES, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1924) § 332.
2 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWNI (803)
353 (Assigned by text-writers as
the source of the limitation).
' Marshall v. Chicago & Great Eastern Ry. Co.. 48 Ill. 475 (i868) ; Railing
v. Commonwealth, io Pa. IOO, I AtI. 314 (i885) ; Hobbs v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., So Wash. 678, 142 Pac. 2o (i914); Schabo v. Volf-Pepper Trans. &
Storage Co., 2-9 N. W. 549 (Wis. 1930).
'Declaration only admissible as to causes of declarant's death: People v.
Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 242. 64 N. E. 814, 824 (igo) ; see Commonwealth v.
Spahr, 21 Pa. 542, 6o Atl. 1084 (1905).
Declarant must have settled conviction of speedy death: Peak v. State, 5o
N. T. L. 179, 220., 12 At. 701. 70i (1888) ; People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333,
67 N. E. 6z4 (1903).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

814

in homicide trials should permit its use in lesser criminal offenses as Well as in
civil actions.' Influenced by this sentiment, a number of jurisdictions by statute
admit dying declarations in cases of abortion and related offenses,' while in
another state they are permitted in civil actions for wrongful death. ' But this
sentiment found its strongest champion in the state of Kansas, which, flatly
repudiating precedent, judicially ruled that dying declarations were admissible
in all civil cases! The principal case emanates from that jurisdiction and is
interesting as a reassertion of the earlier decision which elicited such extensive
comment at the time it was announced.' Conceding the logic of the view which
the principal case represents,"' the prevailing view nevertheless recommends itself
as a prudent safeguard to a very dangerous source of evidence." Such declarations, whether in homicide cases or not, partake of all the evils of "hearsay",
commingled with the likelihood that the many emotions and desires which surge
through the mind of a dying person will militate against the guarantee of trustworthiness' with which the approach of death is said to invest them. Nothing
short of "the public necessity of bringing manslayers to justice" " should warrant
their admission. Beyond this class of cases the arbitrary limit now established
should find support as a matter of policy. The consistent refusal of the courts
to exceed the limit attests to the wisdom of this policy.

INSURANCE-FRAUD--CANCELLATIox,

AFTER DEATH OF INSURED, OF A POL-

CLAUsE-In i919 the insured took out a
life insurance policy containing the clause that after two years it should be
incontestable except for non-payment of premiums. Following a lapse due to
'3 VIGMo ORE, op. cit. supra note I, § 1436; Ryan, Dying Declarationsin Civil

ICY CONTAINING AN INCONTESTABILITY

Cases (i93O) 10 BOST. U. L. REV* 470 (excellent history of prevailing view and

vigorous
argument contra).
6
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) C. 233, §64; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §4034; PA.
STAT. (West, 1920) § 10361; S. D. SESSION LAWS (1921) c. 231.
*N.

C. CODE (192-)

§i60.

' Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914) ; Vassar v. Swift &

Co., io6 Kan. 836, 189 Pac. 943 (1920). See also Escallier v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 46 Mont. 238, 248, 127 Pac. 458, 461 (1912) in which the trial court
having admitted dying declarations in a civil action for death of plaintiff's
minor child, the appellate court discussed their value without determining their
admissibility.
'Note (914)
14 COL L. REy. 5 o; Note (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 739;
(1914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 654. See also Humble, Departure from Precedent
(1921) 19 MICH. L. REV. 6o8.
"0Armstrong v. United States, 41 F.

(2d)

162 (C. C. A. 9th, i93o)

Escallier v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 8; People v. Kraft, 148 N. Y.
631, 43 N. E. 8o (1896) ; Railing v. Commonwealth, supra note 3; 4 C:HAM.BERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (913)
§ 2819; I GREENLE.AF, op. cit. supra note I, § 162;
Larremore, Dying Declarations (1907) 41 Am. L. REv. 660; Note (1914) 27
HARv. L. REV. 739.
'The chief reason for the danger is the inability of the adverse party to

cross-examine declarant and the fact that declaration is not under oath. See 3
V IGMoR, op. cit. supra § 1431.
Rex v. Woodcock, I Leach 5oo (1789) (Classical statement of the guarantee of trustworthiness).
33 1 GREENLEAF, Op. cit. supra.note I, § i56 (oft quoted statement of reason
for admissibility of dying declarations).
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nor.-payment, the insured made fraudulent misrepresentations in securing a reinstatement, effective in i9-8.' Two months later insured died. The insurance
company within two years brought this action in equity to cancel the policy.
Held, that the remedy at law was inadequate and therefore cancellation could be
granted. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Seymour, 45 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 6th,
1930).
The law regarding incontestability clauses, which were originally introduced
by insurance companies to check a growing sentiment that a beneficiary of an
insurance policy acquired only a right to a law suit, well illustrates the willingness of the courts to circumvent fundamental principles of law when the proper
fact situation is presented, and when one party is an insurance company. Fraud
in the procuring of a contract has long been ample basis for a rescission.' The
rule is now well settled, however, that, on the passing of the time period set by
an incontestability clause, fraud in the inception of the policy is unavailing either
for cancellation or as a defense.' This desirable result can best be explained on
the ground that the period of contestability is analogous to a statute of limitations. The insurer may, at its pleasure, investigate the proposed risk prior to
acceptance of the policy or during the contestable period, and is, therefore, not
unduly prejudiced.' When the insured dies within the contestable period the
better considered cases hold that the period of contestability is not affected,'
while others regard the death as fixing the rights of the parties as of that date,
thus vitiating the unexpired period of contestability.' This latter construction,
an example of which is found in the recent case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
' The attitude of this court as to the effect of reinstatement on the incontestability clause is that which generally obtains, VAXcE, INsPUN.xcE (2d ed.
1930) 825.
'Foster v. 'McKinnon (1869) 4 C. P. 704; Welch v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co., to8 Iowa 224, 78 N. W. 853 (i8W) ; 3 Wru-isroN, Co Ra.AcTs (i92o)
§§ 1486 et seq.
'Ramsey v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. io8 (i92i);
American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 558, 92 S. E. 706 (917) ; Central Trust Co. v. Fidelity Ins. CO., 45 Pa. Super. 313 (911) ; see 'Massachusetts
; (925) 73
Ben. Assn v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 268, 30 S. E. 918, 923 (i8)
U. OF PA. L. Ray. 319.
When the policy is incontestable from date, it appears that the clause is void
as against public policy, Welch v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra note 2.
It is generally held, however, that the defense of lack of insurable interest
is unaffected by the clause. Clement v. New York Life Ins. Co., ioi Tenn. 2-,
46 S. W. 561 (iSg8) ; Anctil v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co. [899] A. C. 604;
but see Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n, 118 N. Y. 237, 241, 23 N. E. 186

(I89o).

'Mutual

Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 9o

(1923); Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 283 Ill. 136, rig N. E. 68
(i918) ; Priest v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., ri9 Kan. 23. 237 Pac. 938 (1925) ;
Feierman v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., -79 Pa. 507, i24 At. 171 (1924). As to the

interpretation applied when the words of the clause are that after having been
"in force" for the stated period, cf. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Smith,
157 Ark. 499, 248 S. W. 897 (1923) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note I, 8--6.
0Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 157 Minn. 253, 195 N. W. 913 (923);
Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 158 Minn. 359, 197 N. W. 757 (1924);
Markowitz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 Misc. Rep. 675, 203 N. Y. Supp.

534

(1924).
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Daniel" does violence to the clear words of the policy that it shall be incontestable after two years, by reading into them a condition precedent, and furthermore, this construction ignores the basic fact that the policy was made essentially
for the benefit of the beneficiary to whom the defense provided for in the clause
should accrue
It is in this divergence of thought that there arises a division
of authority on the fact situation presented in the instant case. The jurisdiction
of equity to cancel an instrument for fraud exists when the remedy at law is
inadequate? Upon the view that the death of the insured during the period fixes
the rights of the parties in the status then existing, the legal defense of fraud
remains to any action on the policy whenever instituted;" but, if the period's
duration is unaffected, the insurer's just defense of fraud both legal and equitable
will be forever barred on the expiration of the stated period. Under this latter
view the insurer's remedy at law is inadequate, for to assert its defense it must
wait until suit is begun on the policy. The beneficiary may without hindrance
delay instituting this suit until the incontestability period has passed'
The
instant case, therefore, wisely rejected, both the cases making the rights of the
parties fixed as of the date of the insured's death, and the cases holding the
remedy at law to be adequate, and then properly allowed an equitable action to
cancel the policy.

LAW-RIGHT To ASSESS RAILPROPERTY FOR A LOCAL IMPROEE-NT-The City of San Diego opened a
new street, and levied an assessment against the Santa Fe Railroad Company on
property held by it under a conveyance which provided for forfeiture in case the
property should be used for any purpose other than for a railroad station. The
railroad company applied for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the
assessment on the ground that the railroad property was not benefited by the
new street. Held, that the assessment should be enjoined. City of San Diego
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 45 F. (2d) Ii (C. C. A. 9th 1930).
Property may be subjected to a special assessment' for a local improvement
without violating the Federal Constitution provided the property receives a speMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL

ROAD

=33 S. W. (2d) 424 (1o. 1930).
s See cases cited supra note 5.
Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 (1871) ; Cable v. United
States Life Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 24 Sup. Ct. 74 (1903) ; 5 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON
TiE LAw OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) 4716 et seq.
" Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Aaron, supra note 6; see Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Wiegman, 214 Mo. App. 34, 256 S. W. 5o5 (1923).
In the principal case, an action at law was begun by the beneficiary after
the action to cancel. The court held this did not make the remedy at law adequate, for it was in the power of the beneficiary to discontinue prior to the close
of the incontestable period; as to the right to prevent a discontinuance by means
of the equitable defense see 38 STAT. 956 (i915), 28 U. S. C. A. § 398 (1928).
'"The assessment of special benefits is an exercise of the power of taxation."
Beach. J., in Sauter v. Mahan et al., 95 Conn. 311, 314, III Aft. I86, 187 (i92o).
"..* . special assessments, although an exercise of the taxing power, are not
taxes." I COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § I.
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cial benefit from the improvement.2 An individual owner cannot evade the assessment by devoting his property to a particular use which is not specially benefited; he must pay for the enhancement of the general value of his property.'
Conflicting results have been reached by various courts when they have applied
these principles to property owned by railroad companies. Railroad companies
usually have either a fee simple interest or an absolute interest in their lands
so long as the property is used for railroad purposes. In either case if the property is benefited by the local improvement in its use for railroad purposes, there
is little doubt that it should be subject to an assessment.' The difficulty arises
when the property is not benefited when it is used for railroad purposes. If the
railroad company owns a fee simple interest, it is in the same position as an
ordinary owner who devotes his property to a particular use which is not benefited Under these circumstances the railroad should be forced to pay an assessment the same as an ordinary owner since no reason exists why it should be
given any unique position simply because it is a railroad and will probably continue to use its property for railroad purposes for a long time. However, some
cases have held that the railroad company was not liable to assessment in this
situation because the property was not benefited." A railroad which owns an
interest which will be lost if it uses its property for any purpose other than
railroad purposes should not be in any better position than a railroad which owns
a fee simple interest. Therefore, it seems logically to follow that no railroad
property should be excused from special assessments for local improvements
simply because the property is not benefited in its use for railroad purposes.'
The prevailing view of the courts, however, seems to be to the contrary on the
ground that the property is devoted to a particular use in such a degree of permanency that any benefit which might accrue far in the future is inconsequential.'
-Norwoodv. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187 (1898).
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. City of Birmingham, 2O Ala. 542, 78
So. 896 (1918) ; Diesing v. City of Marshalltown, I99 Iowa 1-7o, 203 N. W. 693
(1925) ; Matter of City of .New York (Juniper Ave.), 233 N. Y. 387, 135 N. E.
825 (1922) ; City of Vancouver v. Corporation of Catholic Bishop, go Wash.
319, 156 Pac. 383 (i916).
'There issome difference of opinion as to what constitutes a benefit to propU. S.
erty used for railroad purposes. See Thomas v.Kansas City So.Ry., _-6i
481, 43 Sup. Ct. 440 (1923) ; City of Chicago v.Chicago & N. W. Ry.Co., 278
I11.
86, 115 N. E.836 (1917).
See supra note 3.
'City of Oakland v. Schenck, 197 Cal. 456, 241 Pac. 545 (1925); City of
Chicago v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., supra note 4; Port Reading R. R. Co. v. Woodbridge, 98 N. J.L. 367, 11g Att. 766 (1923).
Wilson v. Pacific Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 248, 168 Pac. 128 (1917); Heman Construction Co. v. Wabash Ry. Co., 2o6 Mo. 172, 104 S.W. (I9O7), 12 L. R .A.
(x. s.) 1I1; Northern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Connelly, io Ohio St. 16o (1859);
Seattle v. Seattle & Montana R. Co., 5o Wash. 132, 6 Pac. 958 (i9o8).
'Naugatuck R. Co.v. City of Waterbury 78 Conn. 193, 61 At. 474 (19o5)
(land held under a lease for ninety-nine years) ; See cases supra note 6.
If the property is devoted to permanent railway uses by an act of the legislature so that the law prohibits any other use, more reason exists for not subjecting the property to assessments. New York Bay R. R. Co. v. Newark, 82
App. Div. 672, 111 N.
N. J.L. 59I, 83 At. 962 (1912) ; In re 136th Street, 1-o7
Y. S. 916 (I9o8) ; City of Barre v. Barre & Chelsea R. Co., 97 Vt. 398, 123 Att.
4-7 (1924).
3
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PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS OF

LiABILITY

WITHOUT

UNINTENTIONAL 'MISREPPRIvITY

OFCONTRACr-

Defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed by X to prepare and
certify a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of its business as of a certain
date. Defendants knew that in the usual course of business the balance sheet
would be displayed by X to all parties with whom it had any form of financial
dealings. In making the audit the defendants were clearly negligent; the balance
sheet-of which they certified thirty-two copies-reflected a net worth of
$1,070,715, when in fact the company was insolvent. The plaintiff corporation,
of which X later sought to borrow money, requested a certified balance sheet, X
giving it a copy certified by the defendants. In the next several months the
plaintiff, relying upon the audit, made the loans. Upon X's bankruptcy the
plaintiff suffered loss amounting to S187,576. Held, per Cardozo, Ch. J., that a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on grounds of negligence must be reversed;
that the defendants would be liable only if a new trial would establish fraudulent
conduct in certifying knowledge of facts in truth unknown. Ultramares Corhorat'on v. Touche ef a[., 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (i93i).
In any jurisdiction other than New York or New Hampshire the result here
reached, denying recovery in an action of negligence, would have been as predictable as any judicial decision possibly could be. Apart from these two states,
the doctrine has time and again been affirmed that contractual privity is a prerequisite to recovery for negligent misrepresentation.' The trend of the law,
however, as expressed in the language of recent New York cases-through broad
principles which were analyzed in the issue of the REvIEw 2 commenting upon the
decision of the Appellate Division - in the principal case-was such that a majorit 3 of the lower court not illogically felt compelled to hold the defendants liable
for their negligence. The significance of this opinion in the Court of Appeals,
reaching a contrary conclusion, is therefore manifest-and the more so in view
of its authorship. The decision, abounding in food for legal thought, is the
basis of an article now under preparation for a forthcoming number of this
REVIEW.

PROPERTY-PRESUMPTION THAT A CONVEYANCE OF LAND ADJOINING A RAILROAD INCLUDES THE LAND UNDER THE RIGHT OF WAY-A railroad acquired by

condemnation a right of way through X's land. X conveyed to plaintiff the
land west of the railroad by a deed describing the boundary as running "' and
"by" "the location" of the railroad; the distances given carried the line to the
western boundary of the right of way only. The railroad abandoning its right
of way, X gave defendant a deed to the land previously subject to the way.
Plaintiff claimed title to the westerly half of this strip. Held, that plaintiff did
not own any part of the land formerly covered by the right of way. Stuart z,
Fox, 152 Atl. 413 (Me. 1930).
'Landell

v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 4o6, io7 Atl. 783 (i919) ; BOHLEN, STUDIES

IN THE LAW OF TORTS (i926)

' (1931)

15i.

79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 364-366.

'Ultramares

Supp. 179 (1930).

Corporation v. Touche et al., 229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.

Y.
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The rule of construction is well settled that a deed of land adjoining a
highway or stream, the fee of which belongs to the grantor, conveys title to the
fee as far as the center line of the highway' or the thread of the stream,- in the
absence of words indicating an intention, to exclude the land under the highway
or stream? By the weight of authority this presumption is to be applied to both
public and private ways," although some jurisdictions, including Maine, refuse to
extend it to the latter.5 Where the conveyance is of land adjoining a railroad
right of way, decisions in Connecticut,' Kansas,, Pennsylvania,' South Carolina,'
and the Federal courts," as well as dicta in Vermont," have held that a similar
presumption arises, while decisions in Texas' and England' support the conclusion of the principal case that it does not. The reasons given in the principal
case for this holding are: (i) that the reason for the presumption as to highways is that ownership of the land under the highway is of value to the grantee,
but not to the grantor, since only the grantee can make any beneficial use of the
roadbed," whereas ownership of the land under a railroad is of no greater value
to the grantee than to the grantor of the adjoining land, since the railroad necessarily requires an exclusive possession which prevents any beneficial use of the
roadbed by others;' (2) that the mere fact that the existence of such narrow
"gores and strips" of land tends to promote litigation is insufficient to raise the
presumption; (3) that a railroad right of way is more nearly analogous to a
private than to a public way. Possible answers to these arguments are: (i)
that the railroad's occupation of the surface does not prevent the adjoining
'Payne v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 Fed. 626 (C. C. A.
6th, I895) ; City of Boston v. Richardson, i3 Allen 146 (Mass. 1866) ; Matter
of City of Xew York, 2o9 N. Y. 344, 1o3 N. E. 5oS (913) ; Paul v. Carver, 2-6
Pa. 223 (1836).
- Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 -Me. 207, 77 AtI. 787 (1910).
* "The rule . . . is not an absolute rule of law, irrespective of manifest
intention, . . . but is merely a principle of interpretation adopted for the purpose of finding out the true meaning of the words used." Holmes, J., in Crocker
v. Cotting, i66 fass. 183, 185, 44 N. E. 214, 215 (1896).
"McKenzie v. Gleason, 184 Mass. 452, 69 N. E. 1o76 (904) ; Saccone v.
West End Trust Co., 224 Pa. 554, 73 At. 971 (igog).
'Seery v. City of Waterbury, 82 Conn. 567, 74 Atl. go (igog) ; Young v.
Braman, 05 .Me. 494, 75 At. 2o (i9o9).
'Center Bridge Co. v. Wheeler & Howes Co., 86 Conn. 585, 86 At. ii
(1913).
'Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Jarvis, 127 Kans. 365, 273 Pac. 66i (1929).
SRice v. Clear Spring Coal Co., 1,6 Pa. 49, 40 At. 149 (i898).
'Wright v. Willoughby, 79 S. C. 438, 6o S. E. 971 (I908); Boney N%Cornwell, 117 S. C. 426, og S. E. - (1921).
" Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Sutter, 28 F. (2d) i59 (C. C. A. 8th, '928).
.Manyard v. Weeks. 41 Vt. 617 (1869) ; Church v. Stiles, 59 Vt. 642, io
Atl. 674 (1887).
"Couch v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 99 Tex. 464, go S. W. 86o (i9O6).
"Thompson v. Hickman, [9o/7] i Ch. 550.
" The owner can make any use of the highway which does not interfere with
the public's right of passage, as, for instance, storing goods along the way or
digging cellars under it, Allen v. City of Boston, 159 -ass, 324, 34 N. E. 519
(1893) ; he may also maintain trespass against a stranger for any act done to
the land which is not incidental to the public easement, Woodruff v. Neal, 28
Conn. 165 (1859).
Hayden v. Skillings, 78 Me. 413, 6 At. 830 (1886).
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owner from enjoying valuable mineral and other sub-surface rights in the land ;"O
(2) that there is a sound public policy favoring the presumption that the grantor
does not intend to retain litigation-producing rights which can be of little value
to him so long as the railroads easement continues;
(3) that, while a private
way is regarded as temporary in nature being terminable at the will of the relatively limited class entitled to its use, a railroad is considered a permanent improvement in the maintenance of which the public has an interest, and consequently is a form of highwayls The present decision unfortunately adds to the
conflict of authority upon a matter the chief desideratum of which seems to be
certaintv.

TRUSTs-BiLLs AND NOTES-ALLO VING A PRnFERE.ZCE IN DiREcT ROUTING
CASE-Plaintiff, the holder of a check drawn on the H Bank, sent it through the
medium of a collecting bank, directly to the drawee bank for collection and
remittance. The H Bank charged the account of the drawer and remitted a
draft which was dishonored due to the insolvency of the H Bank. Plaintiff now
seeks to establish a preferred claim to the assets in the hands of the receiver.
Held, that a trust fund was created on collection which augmented the assets in
the hands of the receiver and accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to a preference. State cx rel. Sorenson z Nebraska. State Bank et aL, 234 N. WV.82
(-Neb. 193I).
In absence of statutory authority a collecting agent must usually present the
collection item across the counter for payment, for to give the drawee his own
obligation by sending it to him, is a breach of the duty owed to the customer and
is negligence.' However statutes have enabled the collecting agent to direct
route the item to the drawee rather than to send it to a corrspondent for "across
the counter" collection,- and in such a situation to allow a preference on the
grounds used by the court in the instant case it is necessary to overcome the
following objections: (I) The New York rule regards the customer's bank as
an independent contractor for the purposes of collection and allows recovery
" Rice v. Clear Spring Coal Co., mpra note 8.
' Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Jarvis, supra note 7.
" Center Bridge Co. v. WNVheeler & Howes Co., supra note 6, holding the
presumption applicable to railroads despite previous Connecticut decisions refusing to apply it to private ways.
" The court in the principal case possibly might have reached the same
decision even had it chosen to adopt the majority view since there are conflicting
opinions as to whether such a description as that employed in the plaintiff's deed
shows an intention to exclude the fee of a stream or way. The cases are collected in Note (i919) 2 A. L. R. 6.
'National Revere Bank v. Nat. Bank of the Republic, 17- N. Y. io2, 64 N. E.
799 (i9o2) ; Winchester MAilling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, i2o Tenn. 225, III
S. W. 248 (i9o8). In Bank of Wesleyville v. Rose, 85 Pa. Sup. Ct. 52 (1925)
it was held that a bank sending an item for collection to a correspondent, knowing that the correspondent customarily sent items direct to the drawee, could be
held responsible for negligence.
- LAWS OF NEB. (1925) c. 29 permits the sending of collection items direct to
the drawee bank.
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only against it as a suitable remedy; (2) upon collection a debtor and creditor
relationship arises and hence there is no fiduciary relationship on which to, base a
trust;' (3) banking practice authorizes the collecting agent to receive payment
in media other than cash;' (4) there is no trust res which can be followed;'
(5) there is no augmentation of the assets of the insolvent bank." Notwithstanding these objections it would seem that in the direct routing situation the customer is under an increased risk of loss. "With his original item paid' and all
parties thereon discharged, the collecting bank relieved of responsibility' and
the drawee bank insolvent there remains only the possibility of giving him a preferred claim upon the liquidation of the drawee." ' Further it is likely that no
hardship is worked upon the creditors of the defunct bank, for had the collection
item been presented across the counter usually the amount would have been remitted in cash. Therefore it appears that a preference should be allowed, not on
any grounds of legal reasoning but rather as a matter of business expediency2'
'Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 3o8 (875)

; First Nat. Bank v. Fed. Res. Bank,

283 Fed. 700 (D. C. Colo. ig) ; Note (1915) 52 L. R. A. (N. s.) 664; Note
(1926) I5 C.A-n. L. REv. 49. Contra: Bank of Lindsborg v. Ober, 31 Kan.

599, 3 Pac. 324 (1884).
'First Natl. Bank v. Williams, 15 Fed. (2) 585 (E. D. N. C. 1926) ; Hecker
etc. Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. i81, 136 N. E. 333 (1-2) ;
SCOTT, CASES ON THE LAw OF TRUSTS (1919) 64 n- I. "The argument is that,
as the collecting bank becomes absolutely liable for the amount of the item immediately upon collection . . . the imposition of an absolute liability for such
amount seems to negative effectively any notion that the obligor was a fiduciary."
W. L. Townsend, Constructi'e Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE
L. J.98o at 986.
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Federal Res. Bank, 172 Minn. 58, 214 N. W.
918 (927) ; Turner, Bank Collecting-The Direct Routing Practice (I93O) 39
YALE L. J. 463, 483. This leads to the conclusion that the principal is merely a
general creditor; however this objection is explained away by the court by applying the rule that he who claims under a special custom should prove that the
parties contracted in reference thereto. Harrison State Bank v. First Nat. Bank,
116 Neb. 456, 218 'N. W. 92 (1928).
It is only bv the fiction "that equity regards that as done which there is a
legal duty to do" can a trust res be found, for by the application of that rule the
court considers that there has been a sum set apart. See Note (1930) 37 W. VA.

88.
L Q.
7For

complete discussion of this problem see Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
Note (1928) 13 Mix,. L. REy. 39 at 43.
456 at
458;
8
Jensen v. Laurel Meat Co., 71 Mont. 582, 230 Pac. 1o81 (1924) ; see Note
(1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 364 for full discussion.
'Turner, op. cit. supra note 5.
" Turner, op. cit. supra note 5 at 486.
nMany states realizing the desirability of this result have accomplished it
by statute as for example: COLO. LAws 1925, c. 63; N. C. CODE (1927) c. 14,
§ 218.

